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We analyze the existence of equilibrium in an asset market under asymmetric
information. Price formation is modeled as a bilateral sealed bid auction where
uninformed and informed traders submit limit orders to a computerized spe-
cialist. The computerized specialist is programmed to sell to the highest bidder
and buy from the seller asking the lowest price. We show that this mechanism
- which is designed to model the Globex and RAES trading institutions used
in Chicago, London, New York, Paris, and Germany - yields an equilibrium
in which the bid-ask spread is endogenously random and the passive specialist
earns nonnegative profits.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent surge in theoretical and empirical research
on limit orders (Easley and O'Hara, 1991; Cohen etal., 1986; O'Hara
and Oidfield, 1986; Rock, 1990; Kyle, 1989; Berkman, 1990). To our
knowledge there does not exist theoretical research on limit orders in
computerized financial markets. This is surprising, given the growing
, relevance of computerized markets that involve limit orders. For in-
: stance, Domowitz (1990) notes that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
(CME) computerized trading in futures (the Globex system) only ac-
cepts limit orders; market orders are not accepted "after hours" when
the Globex system is matching buyers and sellers of futures contracts.
Similarly, the Retail Automated Exchange System (RAES) used by the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) matches the buyer with
the highest limit price with the seller with the lowest, to consummate
an exchange. The purpose of this paper is to model this type of comput-
erized trading environment. We are particularly interested in the impli-
cations for the existence of equilibrium under asymmetric information,
the ex post information content of bid and ask prices, and the expected
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profits earned by traders and the specialist. To put our model in context,
it is useful to present a brief overview of the related literature.
Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), much ofthe literature uses
a Walrasian model of price determination to examine financial market
equilibrium. In a Walrasian equilibrium, traders submit a quantity order
to the "Walrasian Auctioneer." These orders accumulate, and all trades
take place at the price such that excess demand is zero. However, finan-
cial assets are traded in a multitude of ways throughout the world, and
the Walrasian framework is not consistent with most modem computer-
ized markets. An emerging literature on the microstructure of financial
markets studies the exchange of assets under specific trading mecha-
nisms and intermediaries. The automation of trading mechanisms and
the rapid evolution of asset exchanges world-wide has motivated this
research to focus on the implications of market design - how trading
mechanisms and markets should be structured (cf. Easley and O'Hara,
1992). Importantly, as Madhavan (1992) has noted, models of asset
exchange which depict institutional detail and strategic behavior of-
ten exhibit equilibria and prices quite different from that attained in a
Walrasian market.
Some of the existing literature (cf. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985)
considers markets characterized by a two-price (hid and ask) equilib-
rium. In this class of models, the bid—ask spread is strategically set
by a specialist. Traders on each side of the market take the resulting
prices (bid or ask) as given.' Cohen etal. (1986), however, find that the
bid-ask spread is largely determined by the limit orders of traders on
each side of the market. Rock (1990) examines the interaction of the
limit order hook with a strategic specialist and finds that the specialist
can advantageously use his order-size information. This adverse selec-
tion problem, coupled with the increasing sophistication of automated
processes, has lead exchanges to investigate the potential for replacing
or complementing the role of the traditional specialist with a passive
computerized specialist.^
Order form also varies among exchanges,^ and as noted by Easley
1 Alternatively, Copeland and Galai (1983) assume that the specialist
trades aggressively to earn profits from liquidity transactors, while he loses to
traders with inside information.
2 For example, the Arizona Stock Exchange is a completely computerized
call market where traders submit only limit orders; RAES, used by the CBOE,
operates in tandem with options floor trading and uses only small public or-
ders and marketable limit orders. See Domowitz (1990) for the mechanics of
automated execution systems.
3 The Arizona Stock Exchange and Globex use exclusively limit orders.
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and O'Hara (1991), this affects the transmission of information into se-
curity prices. With asymmebically informed traders they find that when
price-confingent orders are allowed, the specialist sets a larger spread
and prices adjust faster. In terms of efficiency, Easley and O'Hara find
that price-contingent orders are not the problem, but rather uncertainty
over the size and structure of orders."*
This overview makes it clear that the outcome of trading and na-
ture of financial market equilibrium depends critically on the trading
mechanism. The present paper differs from the existing literature in
two fundamental respects. Unlike the Walrasian model, a trader in our
model submits a limit price (either a bid or an ask) instead of a quantity,
and thus there is a type of two-price equilibrium. Secondly, in contrast
to the extant literature on the bid-ask spread, but corresponding to the
institutional setup of the Globex exchange, the spread in our model is
not set by a strategically motivated specialist; it is determined by limit
orders submitted to a computer - a passive, non-strategic specialist.
The next section presents a simple model of a computerized trad-
ing environment that closely parallels the Globex and RAES markets.
We then examine equilibrium and the information content of prices in
these types of computerized markets when some market participants
enjoy better information than others. In equilibrium, it turns out that
the computerized specialist may earn positive economic profits - de-
spite its passive behavior. We conclude with a summary of the key
implications of this type of computerized market environment.
2 Assumptions and Notation
The asset market is modeled as a simultaneous-move one-shot game,
where asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers compete in prices
for the right to buy or sell one unit^ of an asset through a specialist. The
specialist is a computer that is programmed to accept limit orders and
match buyers and sellers. We do not attempt to model dynamic trad-
ing strategies, whereby insiders can potentially manipulate prices over
time to earn profits. This is consistent with most papers in the htera-
whereas RAES and NASDAQ's Small Order Execution System (SOE) use both
limit and market orders.
4 Some automated systems, such as RAES and SOE, restrict the choice of
order size.
5 Easley and O'Hara (1987) examine an adverse selection problem in
trading arising from their assumption that informed traders prefer to trade
larger amounts of securities at any given price.
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ture, including Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Gould and Verrecchia
(1985).
Our model is summarized by 7 assumptions. The first 5 assumptions
explicitly indicate the nature of the asymmetric information in the mar-
ket, while the remaining 2 summarize the nature of the computerized
market and the algorithm underlying the computerized specialist.
Assumption 1: An asset will yield a payoff of v dollars at some speci-
fied future date. It is assumed that Prob(i; = 0) = \ and Prob(u = 1)
_ I
~ 2-
To be concrete, one can think of the asset as a zero-coupon bond with a
maturity value of one thousand dollars if the company does not default,
and zero otherwise. The assumption that there is a fifty-fifty chance of
default is made purely for notational convenience.^
Assumption 2: All traders are risk neutral.
This assumption allows us to focus on the role of asymmetric infor-
mation, not asymmetries in risk preferences, in determining market
equilibrium. It is now well-known (Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1992)
that the presence of risk-averse hedgers can give rise to the existence of
equilibrium in a Kyle (1985) type model, even in the absence of "noise
traders." An open question is whether an equilibrium can exist in the
absence of noise traders and risk asymmetries - a question answered
in the affirmative below.
Since we assume all traders have identical risk preferences, in or-
der to provide a basis for trade we need a source of heterogeneity in
valuations of the asset. We do so by assuming:
Assumption 3: Buyers have a discount factor of unity; sellers have a
discount factor of 5 < 1.
If all traders valued the asset identically (S = I), there would be no
basis for trade, and therefore no need for an asset market. But if S < 1,
buyers value the asset more than sellers, and there are potential gains
6 More generally, the zero-one structure may be viewed as the range of
the indicator function mapping sets of events such as increases and decreases
in an asset price.
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to exchange. When 5 < 1, one can view buyers as young people who
wish to invest in their retirement, and sellers as old people who wish
to sell their share of an asset for retirement. The old generation is
willing to sell the asset at a discount (lower value) relative to its future
value, in order to have cash today. Under this interpretation, buyers are
endowed with cash and sellers are endowed with one unit of the asset;
hence we are not attempting to explain how traders determine whether
to participate in the market as buyers or sellers.^
In addition to the asymmetries among buyers and sellers when
S < 1, we also allow for differences in information among traders.
In particular:
Assumption 4: A fraction ^ of the buyers are informed (and know
with certainty the value of D). The fraction (1 - /3) of the buyers are
uninformed (and know only the probability distribution over v).
Assumption 5: A fraction a of the sellers are informed (and know
with certainty the value of v). The fraction (1 — a) of the sellers are
uninformed (and know only the probability distribution over v).
Notice that when ^ = a = 1 or ^ = a = 0 , our model collapses to
one of symmetric information. But when a, ^ e (0, 1), some traders
enjoy better information than others. We will thus be able to examine
how the degree of asymmetric information affects equilibrium and the
profits of traders and the specialist. Eor now, we assume that the number
of informed and uninformed market participants is exogenous. Later,
we allow information to be obtained at some cost, and endogenously
determine the number of informed and uninformed market participants.
Our next assumption highlights the market mechanism that facil-
itates exchange. This mechanism captures important features of com-
puterized markets like the Globex and RAES exchanges.
Assumption 6: The specialist is a computer program, which accepts
limit orders for one block of the asset. The specialist buys the block
from the seller with the lowest asking price, and in turn sells it to the
buyer with the highest bid price. The computer can accept only two
bids and two asks at any instant in time. Bid prices are denoted by b,
while asking prices are denoted by a.
7 See Baye and Cosimano (1990) for a model where traders endogenously
determine whether to buy, sell, or hold an asset.
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Assumption 6 reflects the passive role of the specialist (the computer
program) that runs modem computerized exchanges like Globex, RAES,
and the Arizona exchange. Similar to the Globex and Arizona ex-
changes, only limit orders are accepted. On the Globex exchange -
and our model - there are two prices: a bid and an ask price. This rep-
resents a departure from market mechanisms where orders accumulate,
and are transacted at a single price that equates supply and demand.
The assumption that traders are restricted to trading one-unit blocks of
the asset is made to capture the practical problems encountered by com-
puterized trading systems. In particular, computerized specialists do not
typically buy and sell for their own account, but rather are designed to
link huyers and sellers. Consequently, by restricting orders to one-unit
blocks (the RAES system restricts index options contracts to 10 and
equity options contracts to 5) we do not have to distinguish between
"fill or kill" orders, and orders where fractions of the desired trade may
be consummated.^ Presumably, this is also one of the reasons actual
computerized exchanges limit the number of units that can be bought
or sold at any instant in time: to simplify the computer program. The
assumption that only two buyers and two sellers are on the market ai
any one instant in time is made purely to simplify notation; none of the
qualitative results below differ when an arbitrary (hut finite) number of
bids and asks are accepted at any instant in time.'
Our final assumption characterizes the information enjoyed by trad-
ers at the time their limit orders are submitted to the computerized
specialist.
Assumption 7: Traders do not know whether they are bidding against
an informed or uninformed trader, but have rational expectations about
the likelihood of the events. Moreover, the book of limit orders is
closed.
This assumption allows us to focus purely on the informational con-
tent of bid and ask prices. If the limit order book were open, then
traders could condition their bids on the information revealed in the
8 Often so-called "odd lots" are retailed outside of the computerized mar-
ket (through brokers or banks). This assumption also eliminates the potential
adverse selection problem that can arise when traders may vary their quantity
orders depending on their information sets.
9 However, tiie analysis is substantially more complex with more than
two bids and asks. In this case there may exist asymmetric equilibria where
identical agents use different bid or ask strategies (cf, Baye etal,, 1992),
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open books. Since, to our knowledge, ours is the first paper on mi-
crostructure ±at formally models limit orders and asymmetric infor-
mation in the context of a passive computerized market, we focus here
on closed books to determine a benchmark for the information content
of bid and ask prices in such a trading institution.
3 Equilibrium Bid and Asking Prices
Given the above game of complete but imperfect information, each
market trader bases decisions on Ms own information, the information
possessed by other traders on his side of the market, the probability of
competing against an informed or uninformed trader, and the probabil-
ity distribution over the asset value. Traders have rational expectations
in the sense that the conditional expectation operators are correct, based
on the underlying distributions in equilibrium. This section addresses
the existence of equilibrium bid and ask strategies in such a com-
puterized market. The next section examines the implications of the
equilibrium strategies for the profits of the traders and the computer-
ized specialist. It also provides sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
to exist in the asset market where traders and the specialist all earn
nonnegative profits.
If all buyers are informed, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists
on the buyer side of the market whereby buyers bid zero when v = 0
and bid one when w = 1. In this instance, buyers earn zero economic
profits. At the other extreme, if all buyers are uninformed, a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists where the buyers bid the expected
value of the asset of one-half, since they are risk-neutral. Analogous
pure-strategy equilibria exist on the seller side of the market.
Of greater interest is the existence of equilibrium strategies when
there is asymmetric information; that is, when some traders are perfectly
informed and others only know tbe probability distribution over v. It
is easy to verify that, when 0 < a < l a n d 0 < ; 3 < l , there does not
exist a Nash equilibrium in pure-strategies. However, we wiJl establish:
Proposition I: When 0 < a < l a n d 0 < / 3 < l , there exists a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium on the buyer and seller sides of the market.
In order to prove this proposition, we first assert the equilibrium
strategies, and then use two lemmas to establish that these strategies sat-
A h*^ ^"*"^1 best response property required of a Nash equilibrium.
A thu-d lemma examines the shape of the equilibrium mixed strategies.
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Consider first the buy side of the market. Let Fuib) be the cdf
used by an uninformed buyer to randomize his bid. Note that, as the
uninformed do not know t^ , they cannot condition their bid on the true
value of the asset. On the other hand, the informed can condition their
bid on the value of v, so let Fiib\v) be the cdf used by an informed
buyer when the value of tbe asset is v. By Bellman's principle, if u = 0,
the informed will bid zero, so fi(O|i; = 0) = 1. This makes intuitive
sense; if a buyer knows the asset is worthless, he would never bid a
positive amount to acquire the asset. The more interesting case for an
informed buyer is the equilibrium strategy when t^  = 1. For notational
simplicity, let Fiib) = Fiib\v = 1) denote the cdf used to randomize
bids wben v = I.
Lemma 1: For 0 < ^ < 1, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium on
the buyer side of tbe asset market. In particular, an uninformed buyer





if ij < 0,
ifb
' 2 - ,
otherwise.
An informed buyer submits a bid of zero if D — 0. But if i; = 1 the




Moreover, the expected trading profits of an uninformed buyer are
£jr* = 0, while the expected trading profits of an informed buyer,
conditional on his information set, are E[7ti \ v = I] = j^f ^^
^ I i; = 0] = 0.
Proof: First, note that Fa and Fj defined in the lemma are well-defined
cdf s. Moreover, as there are no mass points in Ft, and Fj, the proba-
bility of a tie is zero. The expected profits to an uninformed buyer of
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using strategy F* when the otber traders use F^ and Fu are
(1)
The first term in curly brackets reflects the probability that an un-
informed agent bids against an informed agent, times the expected
profits from bidding against an informed agent who uses the asserted
mixed-strategy. Tbe second term in brackets is the probability of bid-
ding against another uninformed trader, times the expected profits from
bidding against an uninformed agent.
Conditional on u = 1, tbe expected profits to an informed buyer




We will show that, given that other traders use tbe strategies in the
lemma, no trader has an incentive to choose F* and F( differently from
Fu and Fi defined in the lemma. More precisely, let i(u) = [0, | 5 | ] and
'(^) = [ 5 ^ ' 2^^- ^ ^ *i^^ demonstrate the mutual best response prop-
erty by establishing the following four claims. Claim (a): the integrand
in Eq. (1) is equal to zero for all b e /(u); claim (b): the integrand in
Eq. (1) is less than zero for b ^ /(u); claim (c): the integrand in Eq. (2)
is equal to (1 - /3)/(2 - fi) for ail b e iii); and claim (d): the integrand
in Eq. (2) is less than (1 - ^ ) / (2 - fi) for b i /(I).
Proof of claim (a): Note that for b e J(U), Fiib) = 0. Hence the
integrand in Eq. (1), for b e i(u), is
for all fc e ,(u), as required.
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Proof of claim (b): As negative bids are disallowed, we need only
establish that for fo > (1 - y3)/(2 - fi), the integrand in Eq. (1) is
negative. But for b > (I —^)/{2—p), Faib) = 1. Hence the integrand is
1 1 fo
b) J 2
which is less than zero for al! i> > (1 — ^)/{2 - ^) , as required.
Proof of claim (c): For b e i(I), Fi(b) = 0. Hence when fo e i(I),
the integrand in Eq. (2) is
for all ii e i(I), as required.
Proof of claim (d): For b < (I - ^)/(2 - ^), f,(Jb) = 0. Hence the
integrand in Eq. (2) is
But since (1 - jS)/(2 - P) < 1/2, dr{b)/db = fi + r(b)/il - 2b) > 0.
It follows that Q > r(fo) for b < {I - ^)/(2 - ^) . Similarly, for b >
1/(2 - ^), fu = Fl = 1, and the integrand is ^(1 - fo) + (1 - ^) x
(1 - fo) = 1 - i. < 1 - 1/(2 - ^) = (1 - ^)/(2 - fi), as required,
D
Given that the other buyers employ Fu and Fi defined in the lemma,
claim (a) shows that it does not pay an uniformed buyer to employ a
different strategy, F* on i(u); claim (c) shows that when v = 1, it does
not pay an informed trader to employ a different strategy, Fj* on /(I)-
These two results follow because the integrands are constant on the
intervals /(u) and i(I), Claim (b) shows that it is always detrimental
for an uninformed bidder to submit a bid outside of i\u) with posi-
tive probability. Claim (d) shows that it is always detrimental for an
informed bidder to submit a hid outside of i (I) with positive probabil-
ity. Hence, given that the other buyers randomize according to Fu and
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FI, there are no gains to an agent for choosing some other strategy.
This is exactly tbe requirement for strategies to be Nash equilibrium
mixed-strategies.
We now turn to the sell side of the market. Let Gu(a) be the cdf
used by an uninformed trader to randomize his asking price. Again,
since the uninformed do not know the true value of v, they cannot
condition their asking price on the true value of the asset. However,
the informed can condition their asking prices on tbe value of v, so let
Giia\v) be the cdf used by an informed seller to generate an asking
price when the value of the asset is v. When t; = 1, the informed will
ask 5, so Gi(a!i; = 1) = 1 (recall that the sellers value the asset at S
when V = 1). Again, for notational simplicity, let Gi(a) = Giia\v = 0)
denote the cdf used by an informed seller to randomize tbe asking price
when I! = 0.
Lemma 2: For 0 < a < 1, tbere exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-
strategies on the seller side of the market. In particular, each uninformed







An informed seller submits an asking price of 5 if u = 1. But if u = 0
an informed seller randomizes his bid according to
Gi(a) =
0 if a <
2-a
aai2 — a) 2 — a 2 — a J
otherwise.
Moreover, the unconditional expected trading profits of an uninformed
seller are £:7r^  = 0, and the expected trading profits of an informed
seller, conditional on his information set, are E[7t( [ u = 0] == ^^~^
and E[7TI \ V = I] —0
Proof: The proof of this lenmna is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1,
and is thus omitted. D
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Most models solve the problem of existence of equilibrium in asset
markets characterized by asymmetric information by assuming the Wal-
rasian price contains some exogenous noise (cf. Grossman and Stiglitz.
1980; Kyle 1985), Proposition 1 reveals that the present model also re-
quires "noise"'" for the existence of an equilibrium, but this noise arises
endogenously from the optimal nnixed-strategies used by informed and
uninformed market participants.
In Fig, 1 we depict graphically the equilibrium mixed-strategies em-
ployed by the informed and uninformed on each side of the market.
Recall that uninformed traders cannot condition their bid on the value
of the asset, but the informed traders can condition their bid on v. It
is clear that when f = 1, the bids by informed buyers stochastically
dominate the bids of uninformed buyers; similarly, the asking prices
of the informed sellers stochastically dominate the asking prices of the
uninformed sellers. In contrast, whenever u = 0, the bids of the unin-
formed buyers stochastically dominate the bids of the informed buyers,
and the asking prices of the uninformed sellers stochastically dominate
the asking prices of informed sellers.
As is indicated in Fig. 1, Fu and Fi are convex, while Gu and Gi
are concave. The intuition for this is as follows. First consider the
strategy of an informed buyer when u = 1. In this instance he is sure
to win when bidding against the uninformed, but cannot be sure to win
when bidding against an informed agent. Competitive forces increase
the density with which higher prices are bid, as the higher the price,
the higher the likelihood of submitting the winning bid. This induces
the convexity of Fi (/] is increasing).
For the seller side of the market, when i; = 0 the reverse argument
applies; the informed wish to put more mass on lower prices, as it
increases the likelihood of selling the worthless asset. This gives Gi
its concave shape (^i is decreasing). Similar intuitive arguments can be
given for the determination ofthe shapes of Fu and Gu. More formally:
Lemma 3: The equilibrium densities used by buyers to randomize bids
are increasing and convex, while the equilibrium densities used by
sellers to randomize their asking prices are decreasing and convex.
Proof: Differentiation of the equilibriimi cdfs reveals the following
10 See Tnieman (1988) for an alternative explanation of noise trading aris-
ing from the optimal strategies of investment fund managers.
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densities for informed and uninformed buyers and sellers:
1 -a
and
Thus, d /u /di > 0 and d/i/dii > 0, whereas dgajda < 0 and
< 0. This proves tbat the densities for buyers are increasing func-
tions of their bids, whereas the densities of sellers are decreasing func-
tions of their asking prices. Moreover, d^/u/di>^ > 0; d^/i/dfo^ > 0,
d^gu/dfl" > 0, and A^gi/dir > 0, so that all of tbe densities are convex.
O
4 The Specialist's Profits, the Bid-Ask Spread,
and Asset Market Equilibrium
The previous section established that there exist randomized bid and
ask prices such that no individual trader has an incentive to change
the mixed strategies given the strategies of other traders in the mar-
ket. Moreover, all traders earn nonnegative expected profit. Following
the literature on imperfectly competitive securities markets where the
specialist is not passive but rather strategic (cf. Spiegel and Subrah-
manyam, 1992), we now extend the notion of equilibrium to require
that our passive specialist earns nonnegative expected profits." Since
the specialist's profit is the bid-ask spread, this section may also be
interpreted as an analysis of the expected spread. We show tbat, under
1 i That this is a reasonable additional requirement for an equilibrium is
evidenced by the fact that many computerized exchanges are privately held.
For instance, AZX, Inc. is a privately held company that owns the Arizona
Stock Exchange. If the exchange earned, on average, negative profits, the
company would go bankrupt and the market would cease to exist.
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om its monopoly power. ^ ^ Similarly, if everyone is informed, (a =
= 1), the specialist's profits are also (1 - 5)/2 > 0, and traders earn
profits.
Finding conditions under which the specialist's expected profits are
positive in the presence of asymmetric itiformation requires a more
elaborate argument. First, note in Eq. (3) that, for a given S, the spe-
cialist's expected profits are minimized when the information partition
IS such thaia = fi = 0, where 6» = 2 - V2 % 0.59. It also follows
Ihat this information partition maximizes the aggregate expected profits
of informed traders. Evaluating Eq. (3) at this information partition,
betting ETT = 0, and solving for 8 gives us tbe critical value, S*, such
that the specialist's expected profits are zero under this information
partition:
2-3^-f 2^ ^
2 + ^-2^2 -^^ y-
Since Bq. (3) is decreasing in S and tbe information partition a — fi = 9
leads to the lowest possible expected profits for every S, it follows
that g < 5* is a sufficient condition for tbe specialist to earn posi-
tive expected profits for any configuration of informed and uninformed
traders.''' Moreover, note that for any S,a, fi G (0, 1), informed buy-
ers and sellers earn positive expected profits, while uninformed traders
pam zero expected profits. We summarize the implications of these
findings in:
proposition 2: Suppose buyers and sellers are sufficiently heteroge-
neous, in the sense that S <S*. Then for any possible information par-
tition (for every a, fi e [0, 1]), there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in the asset market where the specialist earns positive expected profits.
Moreover, the specialist extracts all surplus except for tbe information
rents earned by the informed traders. As the asymmetric information
vanishes (as a and fi tend to zero or one), information rents vanish,
and the specialist extracts all surplus.
The condition S < S* in Proposition 2 is a sufficient condition for
13 Of course, if traders could costlessly bypass the specialist and engage
1 direct exchange, they could earn positive profits. But one of the main
e^asons securities markets exist is that the search and transactions costs of
iirect exchange are so high as to make direct exchange unprofitable.
14 It follows that, for a given S, the expected bid-ask spread is minimized
en o = ^ = g It js maximized, for a given S, when there is symmetric
n'ormation (a = )3 = 1 or a = ^ = 0).
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plausible conditions, the owner of the computerized trading system in.
deed earns nonnegative profits. More surprisingly, we will show that fo;
some information conflgtirations, the passive specialist actually ean?
maximal profits.
Lemma 4: Given the Nash equilihdum bid and ask strategies of ir,
formed and uninformed buyers and sellers, the expected profit of thj
specialist (or equivalently, the expected bid-ask spread) is
Proof: We present here a short proof'^; an alternative proof, which i
useful because it decomposes expected profits into expected reverni:
and costs, is presented in the Appendix,
The total expected profit in the market is :^(1 — 5), Thus it is sufli
cient to establish that the second and third terms in Eq, (3) are the tota
expected profits of all buyers and all sellers, respectively, participa;
ing in the auction. The expected profits of one randomly chosen buye
competing in the auction are
£[7rf | f = 1] + -£[7rf 1 i; =
By Lemma 1, E{7i^ \ v = \] = j ^ , while EITT^' \ V = 0] = E^ '-
0. Hence, EJT^ = f§5|y- Since there are two traders competing fo
the right to buy at any instant in time, the total expected profits K
all buyers are 2£jr^ = ^2-B^' which justifies the second term"
Eq. (3). Similarly, one can show that the expected profits of all tradec
competing for the right to sell at any instant in time are ^"ji""^ • -
Given the formula for expected profits given in Eq. (3), it is cle£
that there exist values of ^, fi, and a such that the expected profits of w
specialist are nonnegative. When everyone is uninformed (a = /i = ^'
the specialist's profit (the bid-ask spread) is {l—S)/2 > 0, whilebuytf
and sellers earn profits of zero. In this case, the specialist extracts i
surplus from the market, despite its passive nature. The reason steit'
12 We are grateful to Qi Li for suggesting this proof.
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the specialist to earn positive expected profits for any possible informa-
tion partition. Note, however, that for specific information partitions,
the specialist may earn positive profits even if 5 > S*. But even in
these cases, there must be sufficient heterogeneity {S cannot be too
close to 1). For instance, suppose each side of the market has equal
numbers of informed and uninformed traders: a = ^ = 1/2. In this
case, the specialist's expected profits are EJI = (1 — 25)/3; uniformed
traders earn zero while informed buyers and sellers in the aggregate
earn information rents of (1 -I- &)/3. In this instance the specialist's
expected profits will be positive if 1/2 > 5 > S*. But with too little
heterogeneity among buyers and sellers (i.e., if 5 > 1/2), expected
profits would be negative.
Thus, in situations where there is not sufficient heterogeneity be-
tween buyers and sellers, a specialist would earn negative economic
profits for some information configurations. In these cases, an equilib-
rium in the more general sense would fail to exist because the com-
puterized market for the asset would not exist. This result is similar to
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam's (1992) results for the case of a strategic
specialist. They show that a linear equilibrium exists in the absence of
noise traders only if there is sufficient heterogeneity among traders in
their risk-preferences. Our results suggest that computerized exchanges
cannot serve all types of assets - only those assets where there is con-
siderable heterogeneity in valuations of assets. This result seems con-
sistent with the fact that the major computerized trading systems (such
as Globex and RAES) currently trade only futures or options contracts
- financial instruments where buyers and sellers tend to have large
differences in opinions about the valuation of the underlying asset.
One of the striking features of these types of computerized markets
is that the monopoly power enjoyed by the specialist allows it to earn
positive profits, even though the specialist behaves non-strategically. In
the case of symmetric information, the passive specialist extracts all of
the gains from exchange. In the case of asymmetric information, the
traders with better information earn an information rent, but the special-
ist extracts all the remaining surplus. This would appear to explain why
there has been a recent surge in computerized exchanges, and why the
exchanges thrive even though the algorithms used to match buyers and
sellers are simple and non-strategic. By committing to non-strategic be-
havior - a commitment which is credible due to govemment regulatory
bodies that audit computerized exchanges - computerized exchanges
may actually extract all surplus.
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5 Information Acquisition
Up until now, we have assumed that some traders are endowed with
better information than others. This assumption implied that informed
traders earn information rents, which reduce the profits earned by the
passive specialist. In general, the values of a and fi will be endoge-
nousSy determined as traders optimally seek to obtain information. In
order to allow for an endogenous determination of informed and unin-
formed market participants, we introduce:
Assumption 8: There is a market for information so that traders may
endogenously determine whether or not to become informed. Let B be
the cost to a buyer of becoming informed, and let S be the cost to a
seller of becoming informed.
Notice that this assumption js perfectly general in that information costs
may be identical on both sides of the market (fi = S), or different
iB ^ S). In the case of stock transactions, one might expect S < B.
since companies send annual reports to stockholders of record but others
must acquire this information on their own.
Assuming that information is accessible to all traders, additional
traders will acquire information so long as the expected profits of doing
so exceed information costs. In equilibrium, traders with information
must earn the same net profits as those without information (which is
zero); otherwise, it would pay uninformed traders to become informed.
Since uninformed traders earn zero expected profits, this implies that
the ex ante gain to a buyer of becoming informed is, in equilibrium,
-E[jTi]v^O] + -E[ni{v=l]-B=O (4)
or
Similarly, the ex ante gain to a seller of becoming informed is
E l \ 0]l7ti v  + El7t, \v=l]-S==O (6)
or
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Solving for a and fi in Eqs, (5) and (7) yields:
Proposition 3: If buyers and sellers can acquire full information at a
cost of B and S, respectively, then the equilibrium fraction of informed
buyers is
\-2B
and the equilibrium fraction of informed sellers is
^ &-AS
a = S-2S
Moreover, the ex ante profits to informed and uninformed buyers and
sellers are zero.
As would be expected, the proposition reveals that the number of
informed traders on a given side of the market is a decreasing function
of the cost of information. Moreover, Eqs. (4) and (6) indicate that,
when there is a market for information, the traders earn zero expected
profits. The information rents earned by informed traders exactly offset
the cost of their information. In this case, only the specialist will earn
profits (provided, of course, that there is sufficient heterogeneity in
buyers and sellers).
The analysis above reveals the existence of an equilibrium in asset
markets characterized by costly information. The equilibrium involves
mixed strategies, and as a consequence, the bid and ask prices - as well
as the bid-ask spread - are random variables induced by the equilibrium
distribution of bid and ask prices. If everyone has access to information,
the equilibrium number of informed and uninformed traders is endoge-
nously determined, and in equilibrium both informed and uninformed
traders earn zero economic profits. The reason is simple: if informed
traders make positive expected profits, then uninformed traders have
an incentive to become informed. Since the profits of informed traders
are a decreasing function of the number of informed competitors, "en-
try" into the realm of the informed drives expected profits to zero. On
average, the rent earned by the informed exactly offsets the cost of the
information.
If some traders have privileged access to information while other
traders cannot gain information, then the number of informed and un-
informed will be exogenous. In this instance an equilibrium still exists
in the asset market with the asymmetric information, but the informed
traders earn economic rents due to their information advantage.
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6 The Information Content of Prices
Because the prices reported on computerized exchanges are the bid
and ask transactions prices, and one does not know the identity of
the buyer or seller (specifically, whether the last transaction was made
by an informed or uninformed trader), it is of interest to examine the
ex-post informational content of the winning bid and ask prices on a
computerized exchange. We consider the buyer side of the market; the
analysis for the seller side is analogous.
Suppose the winning bid is in the interval [0, il—fi)/i2 — fi)]. Then
with probability one the winning bid was submitted by an uninformed
buyer, for informed buyers always submit bids above (1 - fi)/i2 - fi)
when V = i, and bid zero if u = 0. There are exactly two ways
a winning bid can be submitted by an uninformed buyer: eitber two
uninformed bidders bid against one another, in which case the winning
bid reveals nothing about the true value of the asset, or the uninformed
bidder outbids an informed buyer. In this latter case the true value
of the asset is zero. Hence the only way the asset can be of value
(u = 1) when the bid is in this interval is if the winning bid resulted
from two uninformed traders. Since the probability two uninformed
buyers bid against one another is {1 — fi)^, the expected value of the
asset, conditional on the winning bid being in the interval [0, (1 - fi)i
(2 - fi)] is
By similar arguments E{v\b = 0} = 0 and E{v\b > (1 - fi)/i2 - fi)]
= 1.
The fact that these expectations differ reveals that the winning bid
(the reported asset price) does contain information. But since traders
must submit bids before this information is reported, this information
cannot be used by traders in submitting their bids. This is why an
equilibrium exists in this type of computerized market, but may fail
to exist in models where there is a menu price for an asset and no
exogenous noise. ^ ^
15 Importantly, the above analysis presumes that the informed traders used
their information to its fullest potential at a single instant in time; unlike
Mirman and Samuelson (1988), the above analysis does not allow traders to
manipulate prices over time by getting in and out of the market quickly upon
demand.
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7 Conclusion
We have examined a computerized market infested with asymmetric
information. The institutional structure of the market is such that a
computerized specialist is programmed to buy from the person asking
the lowest price and sell to the person submitting the highest bid. This
institutional structure is consistent with several existing computerized
exchanges, most notably the Globex and RAES systems. The key im-
plications of this type of market institution are:
1. Even in the presence of asymmetric information, risk neutrality,
and the absence of noise traders, an equilibrium exists in the asset
market.
2. Transactions prices and the bid-ask spread fluctuate randomly, since
the equilibrium involves mixed-strategies,
3. Traders with privileged access to information earn positive expected
profits, while those without access earn zero expected profits. The
computerized specialist, though passive, extracts all surplus except
the information rents accruing to the informed traders.
4. When everyone has equal access to costiy information, the number
of informed and uninformed traders is endogenous, and all traders
earn zero expected profits. In this case, the specialist extracts all
surplus, net of the information costs paid by the traders.
5. The number of informed traders is a decreasing function of infor-
mation costs.
6. For a market to exist (that is, for the specialist to earn nonnegative
profits), there must be sufficient heterogeneity between buyers and
sellers.
7. Buyers bid high prices more frequently than they bid low prices,
8. Sellers ask low prices more frequently than they ask high prices,
9. In the limiting case of perfect, symmetric information (that is, when
ff and /3 are one), all traders earn zero profits, the asset price is per-
fectly revealing, and the computerized specialist extracts all surplus.
10. In the limiting case of imperfect but symmetric information (that
is, when a and fi are zero), all traders earn zero profits and the
computerized sjiecialist extracts all surplus.
11. In the presence of asymmetric information, transactions prices are
perfectly revealing only if prices are extremely "high" or "low."
When prices are in the intermediate range, they are only partially
revealing.
In closing, we point out that our model assumes that the computer-
ized exchange is a monopoly; traders have no outside options except to
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trade on the exchange. This assumption allows one to directly compare
the results in our passive computerized market with existing results on
monopoly exchanges where the specialist behaves strategically. In re-
ality, computerized exchanges coexist, although at present they trade
different assets. It would be interesting to extend this analysis to exam-
ine the implications of coexisting computerized exchanges. Due to the
passive nature of the specialist on computerized exchanges, this task
would appear more tractable than extending the literature on strate-
gic specialists to scenarios where traders can choose to buy or sell on
different exchanges (e.g., oligopoly specialists).
Appendix
We present here an altemative proof to Lemma 4. which is useful
because it decomposes profits into revenues and costs. Specifically, we
will show that the specialists profits are given by En = ER — EC,
where the expected revenues of the specialist are
and the expected costs are
E c [ - a ) + l-j
, j -
Proof: Since the specialist sells high and buys low, the expected rev-
enues of the specialist are based on the maximum order statistic of bids
submitted hy buyers; the expected costs are based on the minimum or-
der statistic of the asking prices submitted by sellers. The expected
revenues of the specialist are given by
+ (1 - /3)^ / 2fcFudFu(fe) + 2^(1 -fi)f bdF^ib) \
^l 2 f 2 /
+ 2/3(1 - / [
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The above equations have the following interpretation. Half of the
time, the asset is worthless, and the expected revenues of the specialist
are given by the terms in the first pair of curly brackets. With probability
«', two informed traders will compete for the right to buy the asset,
and given the equilibrium strategies, they bid zero for the asset. With
probability (1 —Pf'. two uninformed traders compete for the asset, and
the expected bid is given by the expectation of the maximum order
statistic of the two uninformed buyer's bids, namely f^^^^ 2bFa dF^ib).
With probability 2^(1 —fi), an informed trader will compete against an
uninformed trader. Since the informed trader bids zero in this instance,
the uninformed trader submits the winning bid with probability one,
and the expected bid is simply f-^^^ b dFu(fo).
The other half of the time, the asset value is unity, and the ex-
pected revenues of the specialist are given by the terms in the second
pair of curly brackets. With probability ^^, two informed traders will
compete for the right to buy the asset, and the expected bid is given
by the expectation of the maximum order statistic of their bids, namely
f^^^^2bFl^Fl{b). With probability (1 - fi}^, two uninformed traders
compete for the asset, and the expected bid is given by the expectation
of the maximum order statistic of the two uninformed buyer's bids,
which is f.^^.^2bFudFa(b). With probability 2j6(l - ^ ) , an informed
trader will compete against an uninformed trader. Since the informed
trader bids according to Fiib) and, in this instance, submits the winning
bid with probability one, the expected bid is simply /.^^ bdFj{b).
Similarly, letting j(I) = [ ^ ^ , 2=^] and j(u) = [j^Jl the
expected costs of the specialist are
-I- (1 - af f 2all - Gu] dGu(a)
+ 2a{l -a)
I \ C
+-WS-{• {I ~ af I 2a[l-Gu]dGu(a)
- a ) /
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Straightforward, but tedious, calculations using the change of vari-
abie technique of integration reveals:
^ I r l - ( l - , 8 ) ( 2 j 8 - l ) - i
2 L 2-/3 J '2-/3
25(1 - a)^ 25(1-a)-]
2 - a 2 — a J




Simple algebra reveals that £/? - EC can be rewritten as En given
in Eq. (3) of the text, as of cotirse it should. D
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